What if Liberation Day goes pear shaped? Who gets the blame?

What if “Liberation Day”, when President Trump announced sweeping worldwide tariffs, proves to be the giant misstep that many economists are predicting. Trump won’t accept the blame when it does – he’ll find a scapegoat. His history and rhetoric provide some clues.

Who Might Trump Blame?

Trump has a well-documented pattern of deflecting responsibility when policies face criticism or fail to deliver promised results. Based on his past behaviour, the current political climate, and the specific context of these tariffs, here’s a list of likely candidates I speculate he might point the finger at:

Foreign Countries

Trump has already framed these tariffs as a response to countries “taking advantage” of the U.S. economically. China, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, Japan, and others facing high tariff rates, e.g. China at 34%, the EU at 20%, and Japan at 24% are prime targets for blame. He might claim these retaliated unfairly with their own tariffs or failed to “play fair” in trade negotiations, thus causing economic fallout in the U.S.

• Framing the Blame: “Foreign countries cheated and retaliated unfairly”. Trump might argue that the tariffs would have worked perfectly if not for the “unfair” retaliatory tariffs imposed by other nations. For example, China’s additional 10-15% tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports, or Canada’s counter-tariffs on steel and aluminum, could be framed as the real reason for economic pain in the U.S. He might say these countries refused to negotiate in good faith, forcing him to escalate the trade war, and that their actions – not his tariffs – are to blame for any negative outcomes.

President Biden

Trump has consistently blamed his predecessor for economic challenges, as seen in his recent statements where he attributed stock market slides and inflation to Biden’s policies, despite evidence to the contrary. He might argue that Biden left the economy in such a “mess” that his tariffs, meant to fix things, couldn’t overcome the inherited damage.

• Framing the Blame: “Biden’s economic mess left me no choice”. Trump could claim that the economic conditions he inherited from Biden – such as the persistent trade deficit and a weakened manufacturing base – were so dire that the tariffs were a necessary shock to the system. If they fail, he might say the damage done by Biden’s policies was too deep to fix quickly, and the tariffs’ benefits will only be seen in the long term.

Domestic Political Opponents

Trump has history in blaming the Democrats of obstructing his agenda. He might claim that Democratic resistance in Congress undermined his ability to implement the tariffs effectively.

• Framing the Blame: “Opposition sabotaged the plan”. He might assert that domestic political opponents, by challenging his emergency declarations or criticising the tariffs publicly, emboldened foreign nations to resist and retaliate. This narrative would paint Democrats as unpatriotic, accusing them of putting political gain over America’s economic sovereignty.

Global institutions (eg World Trade Organisation)

Trump has already shown disdain for global trade bodies, as evidenced by the U.S. suspending contributions to the WTO in March. He might blame the WTO or similar organisations for creating a “rigged” system that prevents his tariffs from succeeding, claiming they favour other nations over the U.S.

• Framing the Blame: “The global system is rigged against the U.S.”. Trump could lean on his long-standing narrative that global trade systems have are designed to exploit the U.S. He might argue that these systems prevented the tariffs from achieving their full potential by allowing other countries to “cheat” through currency manipulation, trade barriers, or other practices he’s long criticised.

American Companies and Consumers

Though less likely, Trump could indirectly blame American businesses for not adapting quickly enough to his “America First” policies, or even consumers for not buying American-made goods, thus failing to support his vision of re-shoring manufacturing.

Why This Matters

Economists have warned that these tariffs – such as the 10% baseline on all imports, 34% on China, and 25% on autos – will likely raise prices for American consumers, reduce GDP and lead to job losses. Retaliatory tariffs from other nations could further hurt U.S. exporters, especially in agriculture, as seen with China’s response.

Trump’s deflection is predictable because admitting fault would undermine his “America First” narrative, which hinges on the idea that he alone can fix the economy through bold, unilateral action. By blaming external forces – whether foreign nations, Biden, or global institutions – he can maintain his image as a strong leader fighting against a world that’s “out to get” the U.S. However, this strategy risks alienating his base if the economic pain becomes too severe.

In summary, Trump is most likely to blame foreign countries like China, Canada, and the EU, alongside Biden and domestic political opponents, for any tariff-related economic fallout. His excuse will probably centre on unfair retaliation, an inherited economic mess, or a rigged global system, allowing him to avoid taking responsibility while doubling down on his protectionist stance.

Anyone Else?

Trump could also shift blame onto members of his own administration if the tariffs announced on “Liberation Day” lead to the predicted negative economic outcomes. Trump has a history of publicly criticising his own appointees when policies falter, often positioning himself as the visionary leader betrayed or undermined by subordinates.

Trump’s excuse would likely focus on incompetence or disloyalty within his administration, while emphasising that the tariffs themselves remain a good idea. He might say something like:

“I had a great plan with these tariffs – everyone knows I’m the best at trade deals. But some people in my administration didn’t do their jobs. They didn’t prepare properly, they didn’t negotiate hard enough, and they let me down. I’m fixing it now, and we’ll make America great again, despite their mistakes.”

This framing allows Trump to distance himself from the policy’s failures while reinforcing his narrative of being a strong leader who overcomes obstacles. However, it risks creating internal friction within his administration, as appointees may push back against being scapegoated, potentially leading to resignations or leaks that could further complicate his agenda.

He’d likely frame the blame as a failure of execution or advice, not a flaw in the tariffs themselves, to preserve his image as a trade policy genius. Who are these potential scapegoats within his administration, and why they might be targeted, and how Trump could frame the blame?

Potential Administration Scapegoats

U.S. Trade Representative

The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is directly responsible for negotiating trade deals and implementing tariff policies. He could argue that the USTR didn’t secure enough concessions or exemptions, leading to economic blowback.

• Framing the Blame: Trump might say, “I gave my Trade Representative a clear mandate to make the best deals for America, but they didn’t deliver. They let other countries walk all over us, and that’s why we’re seeing these problems – not because of my tariffs, which are the best, believe me.”

Treasury Secretary

The Treasury Secretary oversees economic policy, including the financial implications of tariffs. If the tariffs lead to a stronger dollar, hurting U.S. exporters, Trump might claim the Treasury failed to mitigate currency fluctuations or support affected industries such as agriculture and manufacturing.

• Framing the Blame: “My Treasury Secretary was supposed to protect our farmers and manufacturers from the fallout of these great tariffs, but they didn’t do their job. They let the dollar get too strong, and now our exporters are suffering. It’s their fault, not mine.”

Commerce Secretary

The Commerce Secretary is responsible for promoting American businesses and managing trade policy impacts on domestic industries. If American manufacturers struggle with higher input costs (e.g., a 10% tariff on all imports increases the cost of raw materials), Trump could argue that the Commerce Department didn’t provide enough support or incentives to re-shore production.

• Framing the Blame: “I told my Commerce Secretary to make sure our businesses were ready for these tariffs, which are bringing jobs back to America. But they didn’t step up – they didn’t help our companies enough, and that’s why we’re seeing some challenges. I’m fixing it now, don’t worry.”

Economic Advisers

The Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) advises the President on economic policy. He could blame them for providing faulty economic projections or failing to anticipate the tariffs’ downsides. Trump might claim he was given bad advice, leading to unintended consequences such as job losses.

• Framing the Blame: “My economic advisers told me these tariffs would be a home run, but they didn’t see the whole picture. They gave me bad numbers, and now we’re dealing with some issues. I’m the one who has to clean up their mess, as usual.”

White House Chief of Staff

The Chief of Staff oversees the administration’s operations and ensures policy alignment. If Trump feels the tariff rollout was poorly coordinated or communicated, he might blame his Chief of Staff for not ensuring that other departments (such as Commerce or Treasury) were prepared for the economic impacts, or for failing to manage internal dissent within the administration about the tariffs’ wisdom.

• Framing the Blame: “My Chief of Staff was supposed to make sure everyone was on the same page with these tariffs, but they dropped the ball. There was too much confusion, and that’s why we’re seeing some pushback. I’m taking charge now to fix it.”

Why Blame His Own Team?

Trump has a history of turning on his own appointees when things go wrong. During his first term, he publicly criticised figures such as Attorney General Jeff Sessions (for recusing himself from the Russia investigation) and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (for disagreements on foreign policy). This pattern suggests Trump is comfortable blaming subordinates to protect his own image, especially on a signature issue like tariffs, which are central to his “America First” agenda.

Blaming someone in his administration allows Trump to maintain the narrative that the tariffs were a brilliant idea in theory, but their execution was botched by others. This approach also appeals to his base by reinforcing his image as a decisive leader who takes action to correct others’ mistakes.

Bottom line: Someone is going to be thrown under the bus.

References

The Truth About Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day”, John Cassidy, The New Yorker

Trump announces sweeping tariffs on major trade partners – some as high as 54%, Rob Wile, NBC News

Trump’s tariff war – a timeline of key announcements and events, Richard Partington and Lucy Swan, The Guardian

Trump Mentioned Biden 316 Times in 50 Days, Mostly to Blame Him for Things, Shawn McCreesh and Dylan Freedman, The New York Times

Exclusive: US pauses financial contributions to WTO, trade sources say, Emma Farge, Reuters

US Attorney General Jeff Sessions resigns at Trump’s request, Al Jazeera

Tillerson’s relationship with Trump fraught from the start, Justin Fishel and Conor Finnegan, ABC News

A-Z index of U.S. government departments and agencies, usa.gov

Dear reader, we need your support

Independent sites such as The AIMN provide a platform for public interest journalists. From its humble beginning in January 2013, The AIMN has grown into one of the most trusted and popular independent media organisations.

One of the reasons we have succeeded has been due to the support we receive from our readers through their financial contributions.

With increasing costs to maintain The AIMN, we need this continued support.

Your donation – large or small – to help with the running costs of this site will be greatly appreciated.

You can donate through PayPal or credit card via the button below, or donate via bank transfer: BSB: 062500; A/c no: 10495969