A most unworthy recipient

Some things defy belief. This front page story is one:

“Former Covid prime minister Scott Morrison has been given the top King’s Birthday honour of an Companion of the Order of Australia for his work.

“Mr Morrison was given the honour in recognition of his ‘eminent service’ to the people and Australian parliament, noting his contributions to his leadership of the national Covid-19 response.”

I believe Scott Morrison is unworthy of this award. Let me make my case.

The cost of inaction in a crisis is immeasurable.

Not all governments have been caught off guard or unprepared for looming threats.

Having worked with both Labor and Coalition governments, I’ve seen leaders who were ready for disaster to strike.

In its final days, the Howard government was acutely aware of emerging threats like H5N1 (avian influenza, or bird flu) and H1N1 (swine flu). In a worst-case scenario, either could have triggered a global pandemic – one that would hit Australia hard.

We had to be prepared.

When COVID-19 struck, the Morrison government was caught off guard. Yet, Australia had once been poised to handle such a crisis.

In 2007, the Howard government took proactive steps, drafting plans to shield Australia from a potential pandemic. The Rudd government later built on this foundation, boosting funding to fortify the nation’s readiness.

My expertise lay in social security legislation – a critical but focused component of a much larger strategy. While a pandemic disrupts health, employment, education, and immigration, my role was to address the needs of income support recipients.

We prepared for the worst: widespread illness or loss of life and the ensuing disruption. For those relying on income support, we had to anticipate the unique challenges they’d face in such a crisis.

Above all, the health and safety of recipients and new applicants was paramount. This required a system where Centrelink interactions eliminated the risk of disease transmission – no face-to-face contact. The existing social security framework wasn’t designed for this and demanded a complete overhaul.

At the time, Newstart recipients reported to Centrelink fortnightly. In a pandemic, how could that continue? And how would we cope with a surge in applications for support?

The solution, though complex, was clear: all Centrelink services – whether for recipients or applicants – had to shift entirely online. There was no alternative. With the Rudd government’s fibre-to-the-premises NBN rollout in progress, this was within reach. Centrelink’s physical offices would close.

Over ten years later, here was your typical Centrelink office when the pandemic hit:

Newstart recipients were still required to meet mutual obligation requirements, despite growing calls for their suspension during the crisis.

The MyGov website – Centrelink’s critical link to income support recipients and applicants – crashed repeatedly. Whether this stemmed from the downgraded NBN (with Rudd’s fibre-to-the-premises rollout abandoned by the Abbott government) is unclear. I can’t say definitively whether a robust NBN would have prevented this, but the question lingers.

Australia once had a comprehensive plan for such a crisis. That plan simply vanished. What happened to it?

Let’s revisit 2007. The Howard/Rudd Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic plan outlined critical measures to safeguard the nation. One key recommendation, found in Section 2.43 on page 59, emphasised deploying thermal scanners at airports to detect potential disease carriers early.

Why were thermal scanners so vital? Here is a succinct explanation:

In efforts to contain the highly contagious virus causing COVID-19, thermal cameras, set up at checkpoints or hand-held by personnel at airports, borders, and entrances to businesses, schools, and other institutions, are being used to screen large numbers of people for elevated body temperatures quickly and reliably.

A high temperature doesn’t confirm a coronavirus infection, but it’s a critical first step in detection. Those with elevated temperatures undergo further testing and, if positive, are isolated for treatment – a proactive measure to curb the spread.

Thermal scanners, deployed at airports, serve as an essential tool for early identification and containment of disease, a practice increasingly adopted worldwide. The 2007 Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic report rightly emphasised this, listing thermal scanners among its key recommendations. Kudos to its authors for their foresight.

Fast forward to August 2019, and the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza tells a different story. Due to copyright, I can’t quote it directly, but on page 136, thermal scanners are dismissed. Bewilderingly, the report claims their effectiveness is low and their use inconveniences travelers. Instead, as noted on page 127, the plan relies on pamphlets and brochures for incoming travelers.

In the critical task of identifying even one potential coronavirus carrier, which is more effective: a thermal scanner or a pamphlet?

I urge you to review page 9 of the 2019 report, which outlines “Pandemic stages,” and consider how the Morrison government’s response measures up in this crisis. The contrast speaks volumes.

On February 28, 2020, Katie Burgess, writing in The Canberra Times reported that the:

Murphy, sadly, must have read the 2019 report which had reached the same conclusion: it didn’t work for pandemics in the past so it obviously won’t work with any pandemics in the present or the future.

Ever heard of tunnel vision, Ms Murphy?

Thermal scanners aren’t a cure-all. They won’t stop the spread of COVID-19 or catch every carrier, but they’re a vital tool for early detection, as countries like China have demonstrated with measurable success.

Ever heard of tunnel vision, Mr Murphy?

Thermal scanners aren’t a cure-all. They won’t stop the spread of COVID-19 or catch every carrier, but they’re a vital tool for early detection, as countries like China have demonstrated with measurable success.

Australia, under an ill-prepared government lagged far behind. The Morrison administration’s inaction stood in stark contrast to the proactive measures outlined in earlier pandemic plans.

Amid the COVID-19 blame game, Victoria’s outbreak dominated headlines, many had rushed to pin the blame on Premier Daniel Andrews. Some, were echoing Donald Trump’s inflammatory “China virus” rhetoric, and had shamefully dubbed COVID-19 the “Victoria virus.”

Yes, many outbreaks nationwide were traced back to Melbourne, but how did the virus reach Melbourne to begin with? Did it arrive from Sydney, Canberra, Queensland, the USA, China, or the UK? The truth is, it came from somewhere – and there was a single body is responsible for controlling its entry and spread: the Australian federal government.

Consider this: Scott Morrison declared COVID-19 a national pandemic on February 27, 2020. Yet, just two weeks later, passengers from the Ruby Princess cruise ship were permitted to disembark in Sydney, a decision that fueled the virus’s spread. Such failures undermined any claim of “eminent service” during the crisis.

Those who were quick to blame Premier Daniel Andrews for Victoria’s COVID-19 outbreaks might want to reconsider.

Let’s return to the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza, published in August 2019. This report addressed critical questions that surfaced during the pandemic, including two recurring issues: school closures and outbreaks in aged-care facilities. Who was to decide whether schools should close? If it’s a state responsibility, can the federal government override it? And who oversees aged-care facilities – is it a state or federal duty?

Due to copyright restrictions, I can’t quote the report directly, but key sections provide clarity on these and other questions:

• Page 31, Section 4.1.4: Implementation of public health measures (second paragraph).
• Page 32, Section 4.1.6: Communication (first paragraph).
• Page 145: Timing (regarding school closures).

These sections reveal the federal government’s role in coordinating and guiding such decisions. Given Morrison’s declaration of a national pandemic on February 27, 2020, his administration’s failure to provide clear leadership on these fronts further undermined claims of “eminent service” during the crisis.

My personal anecdote

My rural Victorian city had been fortunate, spared from COVID-19’s grip thanks to our community’s vigilance and the state government’s stringent measures. Still, I was eager to get vaccinated.

But there was a catch. AstraZeneca, as widely reported, was linked to rare blood-clotting deaths. While the risk was minuscule for most, my doctor warned that my hereditary condition – one I won’t detail here – placed me firmly in that tiny, vulnerable group.

She urged me to stay safe and wait for Pfizer, which was imminent. But when Pfizer became available, I – on the wrong side of 60 – was denied access due to my age group.

Perplexed, I wrote to Health Minister Greg Hunt, seeking an explanation. Why, given my condition and my doctor’s advice, was I barred from receiving Pfizer? Weeks later, I received a polite two-page response from the Department of Health. It praised the federal government’s pandemic response but sidestepped my situation, suggesting I consult my GP – a step I’d already taken, prompting my letter in the first place.

To be certain about AstraZeneca, I sought a second opinion from another doctor at the same clinic. After reviewing my records, she echoed the first: AstraZeneca posed too great a risk, and she’d seek approval for me to receive Pfizer, as vaccination was critical.

She couldn’t secure that approval.

It felt as though no one cared. The government’s relentless push for vaccination rang hollow when I was denied the only vaccine deemed safe for me. Surely, a system could exist to accommodate those whose doctors advise against AstraZeneca, ensuring we, too, could be protected.

This personal ordeal underscored the Morrison government’s broader failures in managing the vaccine rollout – a far cry from the “eminent service” celebrated in his award.

Even the most unworthy recipient admitted the availability of the vaccines as one of his failures:

Dear reader, we need your support

Independent sites such as The AIMN provide a platform for public interest journalists. From its humble beginning in January 2013, The AIMN has grown into one of the most trusted and popular independent media organisations.

One of the reasons we have succeeded has been due to the support we receive from our readers through their financial contributions.

With increasing costs to maintain The AIMN, we need this continued support.

Your donation – large or small – to help with the running costs of this site will be greatly appreciated.

You can donate through PayPal or credit card via the button below, or donate via bank transfer: BSB: 062500; A/c no: 10495969