In 2007/08 we were better prepared for this – in 2020 we weren’t

Part 1: I Was a Prophet of Doom – And Recent Cabinet Documents Confirm It

I must admit, I felt like a prophet back then. Of doom, unfortunately.

I began writing an article on January 11, 2020, titled “Are we prepared for a pandemic?” In it, I wrote:

“The memories of the recent bushfires will haunt us for many years, as will, perhaps, our anger at a government warned of impending disaster yet who failed to act on this prediction.

The cost of doing nothing is immeasurable, but that is another story.

Not all governments have been as ignorant and as ill-prepared to impending danger.

I have worked with governments – both Labor and the Coalition – who would have been prepared for when disaster strikes.

In the final years of the Howard government they were very mindful of a couple of viruses, H5N1 (avian influenza), or bird flu as it was better known as, and H1N1, which was known as swine flu, that in a worse-case scenario could bring the world to its knees. That is, a global pandemic. Which includes us.

We had to be prepared for it.”

Just over two months later, such a pandemic – the coronavirus/COVID-19 – had arrived. And our government was not prepared.

But we were once prepared for this.

Battle plans for such an event hit the drawing board in 2005; an initiative of the Howard government – readying the country for the worst – and some time later the program was given new life by the Rudd government, with a significant increase in funding.

My area of expertise was in social security legislation. No doubt we were just a small cog in a big wheel. A pandemic obviously affects more than just those on income support – the strategy also focused on health, employment, education, immigration and other areas of government responsibility.

We had to consider what the worst-case scenario of the pandemic might be. To put it bluntly: we had to plan for massive loss of life or illness in the Australian community and how to manage that.

What we needed to prepare for – in the event of a pandemic and its expected disruption – were the issues that would be faced by income support recipients.

Above all else, the health and safety of income support recipients – including those who needed to apply for income support – was the number one priority. We needed to provide them with an environment where their dealings with Centrelink were devoid of the carriers of disease: humans. The social security legislation of the day didn’t provide that environment. We needed to change it.

At the time, Newstart recipients were required to report to Centrelink each fortnight. What would the requirements be during a pandemic? How would we cope with the expected surge in applications for income support?

Without going into too much detail (of which there was plenty), the answer was clear: all dealings between Centrelink and the recipient/applicant would be over the internet. There was no other choice. (With an NBN that was FTTP, this could have been handled effectively). Centrelink doors would be closed.

That was over ten years earlier.

But when the pandemic hit, Centrelink’s doors remained open:

By 2020, Newstart recipients (now JobSeeker) were still required to fulfil their mutual obligations – of which there were calls to suspend.

The MyGov website – the key link between Centrelink and the income support recipient/applicant – crashed repeatedly. I cannot say if this was due to our inferior NBN. Neither can I say if this would or would not have happened with a better NBN.

We once had a plan. It appeared that by then we didn’t. But it begged the question: What happened to it?

Now, with the release of 2005–2006 cabinet documents by the National Archives of Australia on January 1, 2026, my interpretation of evidence has been confirmed. These papers reveal that the Howard government was actively planning for a potential influenza pandemic as early as 2005, identifying risks like H5N1 avian flu and preparing measures such as quarantine, border controls, and stockpiling antivirals – foresight that extended into the detailed preparations I was part of in the late 2000s.

It’s a reminder that good planning once existed, and perhaps a call to revive that level of preparedness for whatever challenges lie ahead.

Part 2 The Morrison Government’s Preparedness and Response to Emergencies Failed Every Test

Let’s go back to 2007–2008. The report Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic placed clear importance on deploying thermal scanners at airports (see Section 2.43 on page 59).

What made thermal scanners valuable? Here is the same succinct explanation I gave at the time:

In efforts to contain a highly contagious virus, thermal cameras – set up at checkpoints or hand-held by personnel at airports, borders, and entrances – were used to screen large numbers of people for elevated body temperatures quickly and reliably.

A high temperature did not necessarily mean the person was infected with the coronavirus, but it was the vital first step in identifying possible cases. People with elevated temperatures were taken for further testing and, if positive, isolated.

Thermal scanning served as the essential first line in detecting and ultimately helping to contain the disease – a practice adopted successfully in a growing number of countries.

I said “well done” to the authors of the 2007–2008 report for including thermal scanning at airports and ports of entry as one of their key recommendations.

Now contrast that with the August 2019 Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza. On page 136 – right at the top – the use of thermal scanners was explicitly not recommended, with the bewildering claim that their effectiveness was low and that their use would impede travellers.

Instead, as summarised on page 127, arriving travellers were to be given pamphlets, brochures, and posters. (I wonder if passengers from the Ruby Princess received their pamphlets).

What would have been far more critical in identifying even one person carrying the virus: thermal scanning or a pamphlet?

I also encouraged readers to look at page 9 of the 2019 report – “Pandemic stages” – and ask how well the Morrison government performed against those benchmarks. The answer, sadly, spoke for itself.

On February 28, 2020, Katie Burgess reported in The Canberra Times that:

“The Morrison government urgently purchased nearly $150,000 worth of thermometers at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in case they had to be deployed at the borders.

But the Health Department said there were no current plans to subject travellers to temperature checks, on the advice of medical professionals.

Australia’s chief medical officer, Brendan Murphy, had told media on January 21 that temperature checks had proven ineffective in past pandemics.”

Murphy had clearly relied on the 2019 plan’s conclusion: because thermal scanning had not worked perfectly in previous pandemics, it obviously would not work in the present or future ones either.

Ever heard of tunnel vision?

It was true that thermal scanning alone would not stop the spread of the coronavirus and would not catch every case, but – as countries such as China demonstrated – it could take enormous steps toward early detection.

Australia, under a government that appeared incompetent and careless in this area, dragged its feet instead.

I concluded then, and history has borne it out: that level of indifference posed a real threat to public safety.

Note: There was also a brief 2018 report, Emergency Response Plan for Communicable Disease Incidents of National Significance: National Arrangements, which likewise ignored thermal scanning at airports entirely. In fact, it didn’t even rate a mention – though a ‘police presence’ at airports did.

With the benefit of hindsight, and now with cabinet documents confirming the seriousness of earlier pandemic planning, the contrast between past preparedness and the failures of 2020 remains stark.

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