Trump’s return: Long-term implications for the Pacific region, Asia and Europe

By Callen Sorensen Karklis

Thucydides was an ancient Athenian general and historian who recounted the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens in 5th century BC. He is also considered the father of scientific history.

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Donald Trump’s return to the White House carries significant long-term implications. With his apparent dominance over the Republican Party and a second term backed by majorities in both the Senate and Congress until 2026, there will likely be substantial national and international consequences. These effects may persist even if Democrats regain control of Congress in the 2026 midterms or reclaim the White House in 2028. Let’s examine some of these implications:

Europe: Can It Stand Alone if the U.S. withdraws from NATO?

Tensions between Washington and Europe are rising on multiple fronts. A notable dispute has emerged with Denmark over Greenland, which Trump views as a strategically vital military location. Additionally, Elon Musk – Trump’s special advisor and head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) – controversially meddled in the 2025 German federal elections by supporting the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This effort backfired, as the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) secured victory over Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats (SPD), who had governed from 2021 to 2025. Meanwhile, Trump’s handling of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s ongoing struggle against Russian President Vladimir Putin, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has strained relations further. Echoing his first term, Trump has pushed for European allies to increase their defense spending and rely less on U.S. support, while simultaneously pursuing more frequent dialogue with Putin.

The actions of Donald Trump and the United States have increasingly isolated the European Union, prompting many member states to question their future military alliance with the U.S., both under Trump and beyond his presidency. France and Germany, in particular, are adopting a cautious stance toward Russia, as is the United Kingdom, despite the lingering effects of Brexit since 2016. This could mark the beginning of a more unified Europe, one that prioritizes its own economic and military self-interest to counter a resurgent Russia. For the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949, we may see Europe move toward independence from the U.S. and the NATO alliance. This shift could leave nations like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries to defend themselves without U.S. support. Moreover, Trump’s strained relations with Canada – another NATO member – to the north of the U.S. further jeopardise the alliance’s future stability.

The QUAD: A New SEATO for Southeast Asia and the Pacific?

Unlike NATO, which operates in the Atlantic, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established in the Pacific in 1954 during the Eisenhower administration. SEATO included former British colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, alongside other Pacific territories like Fiji, as well as French colonies in the region, including New Caledonia, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam (formerly French Indochina). The alliance also encompassed Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines, a former U.S. territory. Notably, Japan – where the U.S. had maintained a significant military presence since the Empire of Japan’s defeat in 1945 – was excluded. Like NATO, SEATO was created to counter the spread of communism, specifically targeting the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (established in 1949), particularly in the aftermath of the Korean War (1950–1953).

Ironically, the newly independent India (1947–1950), under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, chose neutrality during the Cold War, declining to join either NATO or SEATO. India viewed SEATO as a potential threat to its regional interests and sovereignty, fearing that the alliance might draw imperial, non-Asian powers into Asian disputes, particularly with concerns over the Kashmir region.

Dissolution of SEATO and China’s Economic Rise

Other nations, such as Burma and Indonesia (a former Dutch East Indies territory), shared India’s concerns about SEATO and opted for neutrality. SEATO ultimately disintegrated amid the Vietnam War (1964–1973), which escalated during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The Nixon Doctrine, aimed at reducing tensions with mainland China and the Soviet Union, further weakened the alliance – a policy continued under Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. This shift was economically reinforced under Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1978–1989), who championed global trade with the West. Deng’s reforms spurred an economic boom, fostering the emergence of a Chinese middle class and positioning China as a global power by the early 21st century.

The Thucydides Trap and Rising Tensions in the Pacific

China’s economic ascent has been accompanied by a military buildup, particularly under leaders Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, leading to heightened tensions in the South China Sea involving mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan. These disputes have prompted Japan to rearm its military for the first time since World War II. This situation aligns with the Thcydides Trap, a theory coined by Graham T. Allison, which describes the conflict that arises when a rising power threatens to displace an established one – exemplified historically by the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, as well as later rivalries like France versus Great Britain in the 1600s and 1700s, the Axis Powers versus the Allies in World War II, and the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the modern context, this dynamic plays out between the U.S. and China, with escalating military presence in the South China Sea and Pacific Island nations, incursions into the Tasman Sea, trade tariffs during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the AUKUS pact – comprising Britain, Australia, and the United States – as a countermeasure to China’s perceived growing threat.

President Trump has increasingly shifted his focus toward Asia, viewing China as a greater threat than Russia. This perspective has strengthened bilateral ties between the United States, Australia, and India, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which began in 2007–2008, was revived in 2017, and continues to the present day. Initially formed as a humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami during the late Howard and Bush administrations, the Quad has evolved into a strategic forum addressing the rise of China. In this context, India has abandoned its historical neutrality, emerging as a significant power in the Indian Ocean region while further isolating Pakistan. This shift is complicated by long-standing religious and geopolitical tensions, exacerbated by the War on Terror and the influence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the region, particularly in Afghanistan.

Australia’s approach to China and other Asian nations has diverged significantly from the perspective of former Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991–1996), who famously cautioned that “Australia should find its security in Asia, not from Asia.” This shift is also evident when former Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2007–2010, 2013) chose to withdraw Australia from the Quad talks. Interestingly, Australia has since strengthened ties with nations like Indonesia, a trend that began during the Keating era in the early to mid-1990s under the late Suharto regime, despite Suharto’s authoritarian rule. This development persisted despite historical tensions, notably Suharto’s invasion of East Timor in the mid-1970s during the Whitlam administration.

Relations between Australia and Indonesia cooled after the Keating era, particularly during the Howard administration, when ANZUS and UN-led peacekeeping forces played a key role in stabilizing the 1999–2002 East Timorese crisis. However, subsequent Indonesian presidents – Joko Widodo (2014–2024) and his successor Prabowo Subianto (2024–present) – have gradually warmed to the Quad, despite initial apprehensions about the AUKUS pact and the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines in the region under this defense agreement. In response, China has expanded its influence through the Belt and Road Initiative since 2013, fostering economic cooperation across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Despite sharing communist ideologies, Vietnam and China continue to clash over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China has bolstered ties with North Korea and Iran, while also mending relations with Putin’s Russia, which had been strained since the 1970s. In the Pacific, China has secured a security pact with the Solomon Islands and strengthened economic ties with nations like Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Cook Islands, and Niue – particularly as these Pacific Island nations grapple with the escalating challenges of climate change.

A Path Forward on Paris and Climate

Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, the United States, under President Obama, committed to the accord, only for Trump to withdraw from it during his first term. By 2021, states on the east and west coasts – accounting for 41% of U.S. carbon emissions from energy use – had taken independent action. Twelve eastern states participate in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), while California and Washington state have implemented cap-and-trade systems. Additionally, 22 states have adopted net-zero policies. Under President Biden (2021–2025), the U.S. invested $400 billion in federal funding for clean energy and climate initiatives, including a methane emissions tax from 2022 to 2025, which was reversed upon Trump’s return in 2025. Despite Trump’s reversal, he cannot halt state-level climate actions or the progress made through prior legislation. However, Trump’s tariffs have raised concerns among international businesses, particularly as major global players like the European Union and China have implemented national emissions trading schemes – something the U.S. failed to achieve in 2009–2010 due to a divided Congress, despite bipartisan support. This has left the U.S. isolated as a national leader on climate, relying instead on state-level efforts and the brief advancements made during the Biden administration.

A Vulnerable Domestic Situation in America

Since the rise of Fox News in 1996, the United States has experienced growing partisan division, a trend that intensified during the War on Terror (2001–2021) and the mid-Obama era. This polarization deepened with the Tea Party movement from 2010 to 2016, and was further amplified by Donald Trump’s emergence in 2016, the MAGA movement, and coordinated disinformation campaigns on social media. The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the U.S. Capitol epitomised this divide. While questions linger about potential foreign interference by Putin’s Russia and the GRU intelligence agency – particularly following findings from the 2016 U.S. election – the full extent of such involvement remains unclear and may not be fully revealed for years. Concerns also persist about connections between Trump, Elon Musk, and Putin, with some speculating that Putin may view Trump as a pawn to exploit, especially as Trump has targeted and alienated China, allowing Russia to capitalise on the resulting geopolitical dynamics.

A Multitude of Challenges for America

The United States faces mounting challenges on multiple fronts, following the end of the War on Terror in 2020–2021 and the rise of China as a global power. These tensions have been compounded by the intensifying Ukraine War since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. In early 2025, a resurgent President Trump further isolated America from its European and North American allies by publicly clashing with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a contentious Oval Office meeting on February 28. Trump’s berating of Zelenskyy, coupled with his decision to pause military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine, deepened the rift with traditional allies, who have rallied behind Ukraine while expressing alarm at America’s shifting stance.

The situation has been exacerbated by a sweeping austerity drive led by DOGE chair Elon Musk, slashing $115 billion from critical government services. Under DOGE and Trump 2.0, entire agencies have been dismantled – including the federal education department – while deep cuts have gutted climate change initiatives, scientific research, DEI programs, USAID, the CFPB, and the Social Security Administration (SSA).

To grasp the scale of these cuts, picture something even more extreme than Thatcher’s UK in the 1980s, Jeff Kennett’s brutal austerity in 1990s Victoria,  or Campbell Newman’s mass layoffs of over 12,282 Queensland public servants (2012–2015). And if that weren’t enough, Robert Kennedy Jr. – now US Health Secretary – has systematically dismantled pandemic safeguards, betraying the very legacy his family name once stood for.

Trump’s tariffs on steel, aluminium, and auto parts – imposed even on economic allies – are a self-defeating gamble. Rather than fostering cooperation, this aggressive protectionism risks backfiring spectacularly. The stated goal of safeguarding U.S. industry may instead trigger retaliatory tariffs from the, especially after Trump dismantled Biden-era climate safeguards like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – which targeted carbon-heavy imports like cement, steel, and electricity. Without these guardrails, the U.S. could face double losses: weakened trade leverage and heightened environmental costs.

The fallout could be catastrophic for diplomacy. 10% tariffs on all Chinese goods, combined with strained relations with Canada, Mexico, Europe, Australia, and India, threaten to isolate the U.S. economically. Short-term gains are illusory; long-term damage – from supply chain disruptions to eroded trust – will haunt the next administration, regardless of who wins in 2028. This isn’t just bad policy – it’s a strategic forced error.

Donald Trump’s second presidency is inflicting profound damage on both the U.S.-led liberal order and America’s own global standing – harm that could take decades to undo, if it can be undone at all. His reckless economic policies risk accelerating the decline of U.S. influence, effectively cementing China’s ascent as the world’s dominant power. Worse, by alienating allies and destabilising trade, Trump’s decisions may undermine efforts to counter Chinese expansionism – raising unsettling parallels to the failures of containment before World War II, when Imperial Japan’s aggression went unchecked.

This time, the aggressor in the Pacific is China – a far more formidable adversary. While history has yet to decide whether Beijing will be a rival or a partner, the U.S., under Trump, is actively sabotaging its own position. Allies are recoiling; global trust is eroding. Far from making America “great again,” this presidency may leave it isolated, weakened, and scrambling to recover long after Trump is gone.

Conclusion: Australia’s Strategic Crossroads

One thing is certain: Australia faces a defining choice. Do we anchor ourselves to a fracturing, militant America, align with a rising and assertive China, or pursue a sovereign path – balancing engagement with principled neutrality? In this new Cold War, marked by arms races and trade wars, Canberra must navigate carefully – acting as a stabiliser in the region while safeguarding its own interests.

No matter who wins our next election, the imperative remains: to secure a stable future in an era of climate collapse and reckless militarisation. Short-term brinkmanship – whether in weapons spending or conflict funding – threatens to eclipse long-term survival. The sky may not fall tomorrow, but the cost of miscalculation will echo for generations.

Yet within this turmoil lies opportunity. When the dust settles, Australia must emerge as a trusted partner – rebuilding ties with the EU, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and India, while engaging China pragmatically without sacrificing our values. The task ahead isn’t just about survival; it’s about shaping a world where power is balanced by principle.

 

Callen Sorensen Karklis was the 2024 Greens candidate for the Qld state electorate of Oodgeroo. He holds a Bachelor of Government and International Relations from Griffith University and Business Diploma from QLD TAFE. He currently studies a Cert 4 in Youth Work. He has worked in retail, media advertising, union and government roles. He has also been involved with Bayside Crime Stoppers in 2015 – 2016 and was on the Griffith Student Representative Council as the Indigenous Officer during the Pandemic in 2021. He also has been a cohost on 4ZZZ radio programs on Workers Power and Indigi Briz. He was also a coordinator for Jos Mitchell’s Leading Change Team during the 2024 Redland City Council elections. He used to be a local organizer in the Labor Party during the Newman and early Palaszczuk eras and had advised TEAL campaigns.

 

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